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Case No. 20140716-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff! Appellee, 
V. 
JOHN L. LEGG, 
Defend.ant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an order revoking probation on convictions 
for aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
resh·icted person, both third degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Aim.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
This is Defendant's second appeal from the district court's order 
revoking his probation. Defendant's appeal is moot because his sentence 
has expired and he has been released fron1 prison. 
In any event, revoking probation was well within the distrkt court's 
discretion. The dish·ict court first revoked Defendant's probation after 
finding he had three probation violations: (1) failing to cooperate and 
comply with AP&P; (2) possessing cocaine; and (3) failing to establish a 
residence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the dish·ict court plainly erred 
for revoking his probation upon allegedly insufficient evidence of 
willfulness. 
On appeal, this Court found the evidence sufficient to support the 
district court's finding that Defendant willfully failed to cooperate with 
AP&P. State v. Legg (Legg I), 2014 UT App 80, 324 P.3d 656. But the Court 
held that the district court had not adequately explained the evidence upon 
which it relied in finding the other two willful violations. Although this 
Court recognized that" a single violation is sufficient to support a probation 
revocation," it remanded because it could not tell whether the district court 
would have exercised its discretion to revoke based on the single violation. 
On ren1and, the State withdrew the controlled-substance and failure-
to-establish-a-residence allegations. The dish·ict court confirmed that it 
would have revoked Defendant's probation on the failure-to-cooperate-
vvith-AP&P violation alone: there is "no question that if there had been any 
finding of violation c,f probation that it vvould have been revoked." 
On his second appeal, Defendant argues that the district court acted 
improperly because this Court had 111.ade a "clear expression of concern that 
the single violation was not enough to revoke [his] probation." 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Should this Court dismiss Defendant's appeal as moot, where 
his sentence has expired and he has been unconditionally released from 
prison? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies. 
2. Alternatively, did the district court plainly violate this Court's 
mandate by revoking Defendant's probation for a single probation 
violation? 
Standard of Review. Whether a district court complied with an 
appellate court's mandate is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See 
McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2013 UT 20, ~19, 299 P.3d 1139. A district court's 
probation decision will be reversed only for an abuse of "its considerable 
discretion.'' State v. Vazquez, 2014 UT App 159, if 7, 330 P.3d 760. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are directly relevant to 
the issues on appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
The offenses. Defendant was charged with nine offenses in three 
cases. See R0677 at 1-2; R1007 at 1-3; R3013 at 1. In December 2009, 
Defendant knocked his girlfriend to the floor, h·ied to sh·angle her, and-
when she tried to call police-repeatedly hit her head against the floor. 
R0677 at 2-3. That conduct gave rise to the first case. 
A 1nonth later, Defendant again knocked his girlfriend to the floor 
and this time st01nped on her chest. R1007 at 3. His girlfriend called police. 
Id. Officers found Defendant hiding in a nearby garage and saw a knife. Id. 
at 4. Defendant admitted the knife was his. Id. Charges in the second case 
were based on that conduct. 
In a third case, Defendant n1ailed his girlfriend a letter in violation of 
the conditions of a protective order. See R1007 at 268 (referencing -3013). 
Trial and judgment. As part of a global resolution of the cases, 
Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in -0677 and weapon 
possession by a resh·icted person in -1007. R.0677 at 246-54; R1007 at 224-32. 
1 This appeal arises from the resolution of three cases: dislTict court 
nmnbers 101900677, 101901007, and 101903013. This 1ne1norandu1n 
references the cases in text by the hyphenated abbreviations -0677, -1007, 
and -3013. For citations, it references the cases by R0677, R1007, and R3013. 
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The court dismissed the remaining charges in those cases and all charges in 
-0313. See id.; see also R3013 at 70. 
The court held a consolidated sentencing hearing and gave Defendant 
two concurrent indetern1inate prison terms of up to five years on his 
convictions. R0677 at 246-47; R1007 at 224-25. The judge suspended the 
prison terms, placed Defendant on 24 months' probation, and imposed 
concurrent 180-day jail terms as a condition of probation. Id. 
Probation violation. Defendant was released from jail on January 5, 
2012. R0677 at 270-03; R1007 at 242-245. Eight days later, Adult Probation 
and Parole (AP&P) filed a violation report in both cases. See id. Defendant's 
probation officer, Jeremy Jeppson, filed an affidavit in support of an order 
to show cause. See R0677 at 274-75; R1007 at 246-47. The officer alleged that 
Defendant had violated the terms of hjs probation by possessing cocaine, 
using methamphetainine, and not being cooperative and truthful with 
AP&P. See id. Defendant denied the allegations. R0677 at 285; R1007 at 256. 
On 24 April 2012, Officer Jeppson filed an amended violation report 
and an affidavit in support of an order to show cause. R0677 at 292-302; 
R.1007 at 265-71. He alleged five violations: 
1. Possessing a conh·olled substance (cocaine); 
2. Using ainphetan1ines; 
-5-
3. Not being cooperative, compliant, and truthful in his dealings 
with AP&P; 
4. Not establishing a residence of record or having changed his 
residence without approval from AP&P. 
5. Knowingly associating with a known criminal. 
R0677 at 302; R1007 at 271. Defendant denied the allegations. R0677 at 305; 
R1007 at 278. 
Probation revocation. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court found that the State had proved allegations 1, 3, and 4 by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but not allegations 2 and 5. R0677 at 307-08; 
R1007 at 279-80; R301:76, 88-91, 94.2 The dish·ict court concluded that, based 
on his violent history, Defendant was likely ineligible for residential 
rehabilitation and that the jail did not offer programs that would help hiln. 
R301:127-29. The court revoked Defendant's probation and executed his 
original prison terms. R301:127-28. 
First appeal and re1nando Defendant appealed, and this Court 
affinned the district court's finding that Defendant willfully violated his 
probation by not being cooperative, c01npliant, and truthful in his dealings 
2 R301 is the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held IVIay 2, 2012. It 
is part of the record in both -0677 and -1007. 
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with AP&P (allegation 3). Legg I, 2014 UT App 80, ,I,I20-21. But the Court 
held that the district court had not adequately identified the evidence 
supporting its findings that Defendant willfully violated by possessing 
drugs or by failing to establish a residence (allegations 1 and 4). Id. iiil19, 
23, 25. The Court recognized "that a single violation of probation is legally 
sufficient to support a probation revocation." Id. ,11 (citing State v. Jameson, 
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990)). But the Court was "not confident that, 
standing on its own, the single violation" it affirmed on appeal "would have 
resulted" in revoking probation. Id. 25. So the Court remanded for the 
district court to identify the evidence that supported allegations 1 and 4 and 
to "reassess whether, under all the circumstances," Defendant's "probation 
should be revoked." Id. 
Proceedings on remand. On ren1and, the State withdrew allegations 
1 and 4 and proceeded solely on allegation 3, the willful violation affirmed 
on appeal. See R377:9; see also Legg 1, 2014 UT App 80, if 25. The parties 
agreed to forgo an evidentiary hearing and to proceed to oral argum.ent. See 
R,.,J_7..-:;•q_1 n Tl1t1c::: thP rinlu n11oc:f·;1"l, 1.r.r.1· t-ho '4-ict1·-ic~t co11rt '\"f,.7;::ls 11 -\;.,rl,c-t-l,o·r "- l •~ _.__,,. .;.,a, ... L,.Jf \...J.I.'-,, ""--JLl..l.)' '-J\..A·"'----41.Jt..._ \..,../.).. _,._,_.I.; • .__1_,,._ ._t...l~•j . .l '-...-. f\· L-111. \.' l......__\...1.l~_J__/ 
under all the circun1stances,'' it would still revoke Defendant's probation 
based on the single willful probatim'l violation. Legg 1, 2014 UT App 80, ,r2s. 
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At the remand hearing, defense counsel informed the district court 
that Defendant had six months left on his original sentence, and that he 
would not be paroled in this case, given that he had "been to prison before 
and revoked before." R377:13. Counsel acknowledged that Defendant had 
"a long history in the system," but argued he was nevertheless an 
appropriate candidate for probation. Id.; see R377:14 ("He is not a problem 
out at the prison and he has aged .... He's gonna have a difficult time but 
he doesn't feel like he's gonna be using drugs. He feels strong and I do see 
he's aged through a lot of these difficult times."). 
The prosecutor argued that Defendant's pnson sentence should 
executed for essentially three reasons: (1) Defendant had an extensive 
crin1inal history; (2) the original sentencing rec01n1nendation was for prison; 
and (3) a single violation was a sufficient basis for reinstating the prison 
sentence. See R377:15. Defendant also addressed the district court and 
acknowledged his long crhninal history, which went back to about 1987. 
R377:16. Defendant also acknowledged that he had previously failed to 
successfully cmnplete probation. R377:17. Before ruling, the district court 
also con11nented on Defendant's history: "'I have dealt with (Defendant] on 
n1y calendar for some tiJne." R377:19. 
-8-
The district court then ruled that based on the single violation for not 
cooperating with AP&P, it would have revoked and would still revoke 
Defendant's probation even absent any other violation: "There is no 
question that had I found a violation, looking at his history, looking at the 
recommendation, looking at the opportunity for probation that he had 
received, I would have iinposed the original sentence." R377:23. ,.,My 
finding is that based on what information the court had at the time that 
there was a finding [ of] a violation of probation [ and] that it was properly a 
basis for revoking probation, looking at the entire history of both cases." 
R377:24-25. 
The court 1nade clear that it would reach the same result reassessing 
the question on re1nand: "[T]he only question [that] re1nains is, was the 
revocation of probation sufficient on that one single violation? And I have 
no question that that would have been my ruling, and that I find that those 
circumstances still support it." R377:24 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, district court confirrn.ed ils revocation of Defendant's 
probation and execution of his suspended sentences. R377:24--25; R0677:368--
69. 
Defendant again appealed. See R.0677:360. 
-9-
·During the pendency of the appeal, Defendant con1pleted his prison 
sentence and was unconditionally released from custody. See Utah 
Department of Corrections letter confirming that Defendant was discharged 
from prison on July 15, 2015 (attached in Addendum B).3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should dismiss the appeal because it is moot. An appeal is 
moot if during the pendency of the appeal circu1nstances change so that the 
controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested impossible 
or of no legal effect. Defendant challenges the revocation of his probation. 
But Defendant has already served his prison sentence, and he has been 
discharged frmn custody. Thus, his probation cannot be reinstated. 
Alternatively, Defendant's argu1nent fails on the 1nerits. Defendant 
argues that the district court violated this Court's mandate when it 
reaffirn1ed his probation revocation. Because Defendant did not make this 
argument below, it is unpreserved and he must show plain error. But 
3 Although not included in the record on appeal, this Court n,ay take 
judicial notice of the DepartJ.11ent of Corrections discharge letter. See Utah 
R. Ev.id. 201 ( court 111a y judicially notice fact that is not subject to dj.spute 
because it can be accurately and readily determined frorn sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned); see also State ex rel. F.M., 2002 
UT App 340, if3, n.2, 57 P.3d 1130 ("Courts 1nay take judicial notice of the 
records and prior proceedings in the same case.") 
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Defendant cannot show that the district court plainly erred when, in 
accordance with this Court's mandate, it determined that it would have 
revoked Defendant's probation on the basis of the single probation violation 
affirmed by this Court. Nor can Defendant show that the decision was an 
abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THIS APPEAL AS MOOT 
Defendant argues that the trial court unjustly revoked his probation, 
both when it originally revoked and ·when it reaffirmed its revocation 
decision on remand. He asks this Court to again reverse the district court's 
decision and remand for it to again detennine whether, under all the 
circu1nstances, Defendant's probation should have been revoked. 
But Defendant's sentence has now expired, and he has been released 
frmn prison. This Court, therefore, cannot give him any relief, and his 
appeal is 1noot. 
A. An appeal is moot when the requested relief cannot affect the 
rights of the appellant. 
The mootness doctrine. /-\n issue is rnoot when the requested. relief 
cam1ot affect the rights of the appellant. State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 
(Utah 1994); see Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union 
-11-
(Local 382), 2012 UT 75, ifl9, 289 P.3d 582. "The defining feature of a moot 
conh·oversy is the lack of capacity for the court to order a remedy that will 
have a meaningful impact on the practical positions of the parties." Local 
382, 2012 UT 75, ,I14. An issue becomes moot while an appeal is pending if 
"circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby 
rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect." State v. 
Black, 2015 UT 54, _ Utah Adv. Rep. _ (quoting Local 382, 2012 UT 75, 
114) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Peterson, 2012 UT 
App 363, if 4, 293 P.3d 1103; accord In re Adoption of L.O., 2012 UT 23, ,IS, 282 
P.3d 977; State v. Hooker, 2013 UT App 91, if 2, 300 P.3d 1292. See also Local 
382, 2012 UT 75, ,I15 n.1 (citing Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653-54 (1895), for 
proposition that "an appeal should be dismissed as moot where, by virtue 
of an ✓ intervening event' the appellate court cannot f grant ... any effectual 
relief whatever' in favor of the appellant"). 
When an issue is 1noot, both judicial policy and the Utah Constitution 
'" dictate[]'" that the court not issue an advisory opinion. Featherson v. Utah 
Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2013 UT App 17, il31 295 P.3d 715 (per curian1) 
(citing Sims, 881 P.2d at 841); Local 382, 2012 UT 75, ,r,n.6, 19, 20. A lYLOOt 
appeal 11 '1nust be disrn.issed ... unless it can be shown to fit within a 
recognized exception to the 1nootness principle."' Hooker, 2013 UT App 91, 
-12-
12 (citation omitted). That is because the court has "no power to decide 
absh"act questions or to render declaratory judgments, in the absence of an 
actual conh·oversy directly involving rights." Local 382, 2012 UT 75, if 19. 
Exceptions to mootness. Utah law recognizes two co1nmon 
exceptions to the mootness rule. The first is for technically moot cases that 
present issues of public interest likely to recur and capable of evading 
review. The Utah Supreme Court discussed that exception in Ellis v. 
Swensen, a case dealing with ballet booklets. 2000 UT 101, 16 P.3d 1233. 
That exception applies "when a case presents an issue that affects the public 
interest, is likely to recur, and because of the brief time that any one litigant 
is affected, is capable of evading review." Id. if26; see also Local 382, 2012 UT 
75, ,I,I30-33. The court explained that the issues of public interest which it 
has addressed under this exception are generally II class actions, questions of 
constitutional interpretation, issues as to the validity or consh·uction of a 
statute, or the propriety of administrative rulings." Ellis, 2000 UT 101, 4TI27 
(quoting McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974) (internal 
quotation marks 0111.itted) ( ernphasis omitted.)). 
The other exception is for a case that is technically moot, but will 
nonetheless likely result in negative collateral legal consequences. The Utah 
Supre1ne Court discussed that exception in Duran v. Morris. See 635 P.2d 43 
-13-
(Utah 1981). The court explained that "it is now clearly established that "a 
criininal case is 1noot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any 
collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the criminal 
conviction."' Id. if 45. "Such collateral consequences may include the use of 
the conviction to hnpeach the petitioner's character or as a factor in 
determining a sentence in a future trial, as well as the petitioner's inability 
to vote." Id. (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968); Carafas v. 
La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968)). 
But the court also explained that other criminal cases "'entail no 
collateral legal consequences of the kind that result from a criminal 
conviction." Id. That was h·ue for Duran, who petitioned the district court 
for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that prison officials had violated his 
constitutional rights by h·ansferring hin1 frmn medium to maximum 
security. Id. 45. The district court denied Duran's petition for the writ, and 
Duran appealed. Id. But at the time Utah Supreme Court addressed 
Duran's appeal, Duran had been returned to n1edim11 security. Id. The 
court held that the case was 1noot. The court could give Duran no relief, 
and the administrative decisions he chal1enged did not entail legal 
consequences of the kind "that result from criminal convictions." Id. 
-14-
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Utah's law is consistent with federal law. Federal law has long 
recognized the 1nootness doctrine and will dismiss an appeal as moot 
"where, by virtue of an 'intervening event' the appellate court cannot' grant 
... any effectual relief whatever' in favor of the appellant." Mills v. Green, 
159 U.S. at 653-54. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly dismissed 
federal criminal appeals because they were 1noot and the Court could 
provide the defendants with no relief. See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 
(1998); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982); cf United States v. Juvenile Male, 
131 S.Ct. 2860 (2011) Quvenile offender's appeal moot where court could 
provide no relief). 
But the Supreme Court also recognizes exceptions to the mooh'1ess 
doch·ine. In a number of criminal cases, it has held that an appeal was not 
moot, even though the defendant had served his sentence, because the 
defendant's conviction would likely result in adverse collateral legal 
consequences. In Sibron v. New York, the Court acknowledged "the obvious 
fact of life that most crin1inal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral 
(-r-.1--.coq1101--.rpc " C.:oc' 'J.O'") ILJ C: .-.1- i;,::i. ~i::; (cii-1·1",.... CJc"'lJl·C1( •n I fll;t•'·'(-1 C;.,.,fpc ~'10 J TC , •• \._J Iv'-• -l---dl'-......:..,.J. l.ll-. ,..J.//- .,J. (ii v-....r-vv .t.L t5 L l,Jt . I L•. L, /., t,.t ... .11.,tLt..,,.11 >.....JL./ ____, • ._;. 
211 (1946); United Sf-afes v. JV1_orga11 1 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Pollard v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957)). Under the Court's law, the mere possibility that 
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a conviction will result in such consequences preserves a criminal case from 
dismissal for mootness." Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55. 
Challenges to convictions. Under both Utah and federal law, the 
difference between criminal cases that become moot upon the expiration of 
a sentence and those that do not is the nature of the defendant's challenge. 
Even though a def end ant's sentence has expired, if he challenges his 
conviction, the courts presume that the conviction will have adverse 
collateral legal consequences- actual consequences that are imposed by 
law. For that reason, the Utah Supreme Court has explained that a 
challenge to a conviction constitutes an exception to the mootness rule. See 
Duran, 635 P.2d at 45. Accordingly, when a defendant challenges a criminal 
conviction, the court will presu1ne that the conviction will carry collateral 
legal consequences. Id. The case will therefore be dismissed as moot only if 
it is shown that "there is no possibility that any collateral consequences will 
be in1posed on the basis of the challenged conviction.'" Duran, 635 P.2d at 
45 ( citing Sibron, 392 U.S. at 57). 
'T'his too is consistent with federal lmv. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 57 n.17 
(althougli sentence had been con1pleted while appeal was pending, adverse 
consequences could flow from New York state law permitting use of 
conviction to impeach character of a defendant in later criminal 
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proceeding); Cara/as, 391 U.S. at 237 (criminal conviction may preclude a 
person's engaging in certain businesses, serving as a labor union official, 
serving as a juror, or voting); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 632 n.2 
(1968) (criminal conviction could result in ineligibility for licensing under 
state and municipal license laws); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 221 
(1946) ( conviction could subject defendant to adverse legal consequences 
affecting deportation). 
Challenges to sentences, probation and parole revocation, etc. But 
where a defendant challenges something other than his conviction - for 
example, his sentence, his probation or parole revocation, or a prison 
segregation order-collateral consequences like those attendant to a 
criminal conviction are not likely. In those cases, Utah law holds that 
expiration of the sentence renders the case moot unless the defendant can 
show some actual adverse legal consequence, some concrete injury-in-fact. 
Accordingly, the courts do not presu1ne the existence of such consequences 
in a case where the defendant is not challenging his conviction. 
AC: evnl::.i11e<-i 1·n nr,-va11 ll 1 ]J"'.:'.\11 rh~lln,,aed the ri1'sh•1("'t cou1·1-'s d 0 J"'ia1 nf. 1--t~ ~··,.t __ ,....._c.__. __ .._ -t, ·--'-'- 1..~, .. ._,,._.,, , .. , iJ'-- c1 ....... ..ttCt J.."--L'--b "--t.. .1.'- L '- _L.:... ·J • ...._...,J 
his petition for a write of habeas corpus, clai1ning that prison officials had 
violated his constitutional right by transferring hiln from mediun1. to 
maximum security. 635 P.2d at if 45. By the lime the Utah Supreme Court 
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addressed the appeal, Duran had been returned to 1nediu1n security. Id. 
The court held that the appeal was moot. Id. It could give him no relief, 
and the administrative decisions he challenged did not entail legal 
consequences like those resulting from criminal convictions. Id. 
This Court has addressed exceptions to the mootness doctrine in 
nu1nerous cases. It has distinguished challenges to convictions from 
challenges to sentencing, probation and parole revocation, stalking 
injunctions, and prison discipline orders. 
In a series of cases, this Court has held that an appeal from a sentence 
is moot once a defendant has served his sentence, been released from jail, 
and had his case closed. See State v. McClellan, 2014 UT App 271, 339 P.3d 
942 (addressing challenge to sentences where sentences had been served); 
State v. Matthews, 2014 UT App 169, 332 P.3d 406 (addressing challenge to 
probation revocation where sentence had been served); Featherson v. Utah 
Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2013 UT App 17,295 P.3d 715 (addressing challenge 
to decision denying parole where sentence had been served); Hooker, 2013 
UT App 91 (addressing challenge to probation revocation ,;vhere sentence 
had been served); St-ate v. Pet-erson, 2012 UT App 363, 293 F.3d 1103 
(addressing challenge to sentence where sentence had been served); cf 
Towner v. Ridgzvay (Ridgway), 2012 UT App 35, ,r2, 272 P.3d 765 (addressing 
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challenge to stalking injunction where injunction had expired); State v. 
Moore, 2009 UT App 128, 210 P.3d 967 (addressing challenge to discipline 
imposed while defendant was in jail awaiting sentencing where defendant 
had been sentenced and transferred to prison). 
Each of these cases held that the relief sought was impossible or of no 
legal effect because the sentence had been served and the case was there£ ore 
moot. In Hooker, this Court noted that Hooker had not alleged, much less 
demonstrated that either the collateral consequences or public interest 
exception applied. 2013 UT App 91, if 3. In McClellan, the court addressed 
McClellan's claim of possible legal consequences, but held that the 
consequences that he proffered were not hnposed by law and thus did not 
qualify as collateral consequences in the mootness context. 2014 UT App 
271, if 5. Nor did the appeal fit within the exception for an alleged wrong 
11 
capable of repetition yet evading review." Id. ,r 6. In Peterson, the Court 
expressly stated that because Peterson did not challenge his conviction, 11 the 
collateral consequences attendant to an unlawful conviction [were] not at 
issue." 2012 UT App 363, 1l5. In Ridgwny, the Court refused to presun1e that 
Ridgway's expired civil stalking injunction in1posed negative collateral legal 
consequences on him. 2012 UT App 35, irif7-11. The Court reiterated, 
"Unless a party is challenging a crilninal conviction, we will not presume 
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that such collateral consequences exist." Id. if 7. In Moore, the Court held 
that the decision to place Moore in solitary confinement would have no 
bearing on his ability to vote, engage in businesses, or serve on a jury; it 
could not be used to impeach his character or as a factor in determining a 
sentence in a future trial; and it did not require that the parole board deny 
parole in a future hearing. 2009 UT App 128, ,rif13, 17. Any collateral 
consequences resulting from Moore's prison disciplinary record were 
hypothetical, and the Court would not presume them. Id. ,r,r17-19. 
The court of appeals has also entered a series of orders dismissing 
appeals as moot because the defendants had served their sentences and 
consequently no relief was available on appeal. See State v. Reynolds, 
20140706-CA, order dated Dece1nber 18, 2014 (sentence completed); State v. 
Craner, 20130526-CA, order dated February 27, 2014 (challenge to h 4 ial 
court's order terminating probation was moot; defendant had completed his 
jail confine1nent and probation was tern1inated; unlike collateral 
consequences of crilninal convictions, "collateral consequences regarding 
the effect of terminating probation as unsuccessful are merely hypothetical 
rather than aclual adverse consequences that would defeat rnootness"); State 
v. Herrera, 20130368-CA, order dated January 23, 2014 (challenge to district 
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court's sentencing decision moot where sentence completed and defendant 
released from jail; no collateral consequences alleged or demonstrated). 
Utah's law is consistent with federal law. Federal law also presumes 
that convictions carry collateral legal consequences, but that sentences, 
probation and parole revocations, and most other criminal matters do not. 
In Lane v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that Williams' challenge to the 
court's failure to advise him of a 1nandatory state parole requirement was 
moot because Williams had completed parole and been released. 455 U.S. 
624, 626-33 (1982). Revocation of Williams' parole and incarceration for his 
parole violation subjected him to no legal collateral consequences. Id. "At 
most, certain non-statutory consequences [1night] occur; employment 
prospects, or the sentence imposed in a future criminal proceeding could be 
affected." Id. 632. But, the Supreme Court reasoned, the "discretionary 
decisions that are made by an en1ployer or a sentencing judge ... are not 
governed by the mere presence or absence of a recorded violation of parole; 
these decisions may take into consideration, and are 1nore directly 
influenced by, the underlying conduct that formed the basis for the parole 
violation. Any disabilities that flmv frorn whatever respondents did to 
evoke revocation of parole are not re1noved- or even affected- by a District 
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Court order that simply recites that their parole terms are 'void."' Id. 632-
33. 
In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), the Supreme Court held that 
Randy Spencer's challenge to allegedly unconstitutional parole revocation 
procedures was moot because his sentence had expired. The Court declined 
"to presume that collateral consequences adequate to meet Article Ill's 
injury-in-fact requirement resulted from petitioner's parole revocation." Id. 
14. Citing Sibron, the Court noted that it had, in recent decades, "been 
willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing 
collateral consequences." Id. 8. But, the Court observed, Spencer did not 
"attack his convictions for felony stealing and burglary''; rather, he asserted 
"only the wrongful termination of his parole status." Id. 9. 
The Court noted that in the context of criminal convictions, "the 
presu1nption of significant collateral consequences is likely to c01nport with 
reality." Id. 12. But, the Court continued, the "same cannot be said of parole 
revocation." Id. Citing Williams, the Court noted that it had hitherto 
r 
1 t ' 1 • 11 • f 11 1 ff 1 rerusea -o exrenG 1ts presun1pt10n o · co atera consequences to paro e 
revocation. Id. 12 (citing 455 U.S. at 624). The Court observed that it "was 
not enough that the parole violations found by the revocation decision 
would enable the parole board to deny (Willia1ns] parole in the future," 
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where the violations did not render hhn ineligible for parole, but were 
'"simply one factor, a1nong many, that may be considered by the parole 
authority."' Id. 13 (quoting Williams, 455 U.S. at 639-40). Moreover, the 
parole violations remaining on Williams' record could not affect a 
subsequent parole determination unless he again violated the law. Id. 
Finally, these "nonstatutory consequences" were "dependent upon '[t]he 
discretionary decisions . . . made by an employer or a sentencing judge ... 
not governed by the mere presence or absence of a recorded violation of 
parole.'" Id. (quoting Williams, 455 U.S. at 632-33). 
Thus, the Spencer court declined "to presume that collateral 
consequences adequate to meet Article III' s injury-in-fact requirement 
resulted from petitioner's parole revocation." Id. 14. The Court recogn.ized 
that Spencer could avoid a d isn1issal by showing a concrete injury-in-fact, 
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but it rejected the four injuries that he proffered because they did not 
constitute concrete injuries-in-fact.4 Id. 14-16. 
In sum, under both Utah and federal law, the courts presu1ne that a 
conviction will result in a negative collateral legal consequences and, unless 
the State can show that such consequences are impossible, will hear a 
defendant's challenge to a conviction even if he is no longer in custody. But 
the courts will not presume that a challenge to a parole revocation or any 
other sentence (such as probation) will result in negative collateral legal 
consequences. Thus, when a Defendant challenges his sentence or 
probation or parole revocation, the case will be moot if his sentence has 
expired unless the Defendant can show a concrete injury-in-fact. 
4 The Spencer decision gives guidance about what does not constitute 
a concrete injury-in-fact. Spencer argued he had suffered the following 
injuries-in-fact: (1) his parole revocation could be used to his deh·iment in a 
future parole proceeding, (2) the revocation could be used to increase his 
sentence in a future sentencing procedure, (3) the revocation could be used 
to iinpeach hiln in a future criininal proceeding, and (4) the revocation 
n1ight be used directly against hin1 in a future crim.inal proceeding. Spencer, 
523 U.S. at 14-16. The Court rejected them all. The Court held that the 
asserted injuries depended on Spencer's again violating the law and on 
discretionary decisions by the prosecutor and the presiding judge in any 
future criminal proceedings. Id. They were thus merely hypothetical, not 
actual consequences or injuries. Id. Iv1oreover, they were not imposed by 
law. Id. 
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Stated another way, where a defendant challenges his conviction, the 
State has the burden to show that no collateral legal consequences are 
possible. But when a defendant challenges something other than his 
conviction-for instance, his sentence or his probation revocation-the 
defendant has the burden to show that collateral legal consequences 
actually exist, i.e., that there is a concrete injury-in-fact. 
As explained on pages 18 to 21, supra, this Court has recognized and 
applied this precedent in numerous decisions. But the State acknowledges 
that in two anomalous 2015 cases the Court did not. In State v. Warner, 2015 
UT App 81, 347 P.3d 846, and State v. Allen, 2015 UT App 163, 789 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 5, this Court declined to dismiss as moot challenges to probation 
revocations, even though the defendants had served their sentences and 
been released from jail. In Warner, the Court addressed Warner's challenge 
to his probation revocation, even though Warner had con1pleted his 
sentences and had been released from jail. 2015 UT App 81, ,1. In Allen, 
the Court addressed Allen's· clailn that trial counsel had rendered ineffective 
assistance in connection vvith his probation revocation, even though Allen 
had also been reieased fron1 custody. 2015 UT App 163, '1j,f1 & 4 n.2. 
Neither case involved a challenge to a criminal conviction. Rather both 
-25-
Warner and Allen challenged the revocation of probation. Warner, 2015 UT 
App -81, 'ffl; Allen, 2015 UT App 163, ,r1. 
The Allen court stated that it was "'not convinced that Allen face[d] no 
collateral legal consequences as a result of his felony conviction and 
revoked probation terms." 2015 UT App 163, if 4 n.2 But Allen did not 
challenge his conviction. Rather, he argued that his trial counsel had 
rendered ineffective assistance by not asserting that he had mental health 
issues as a defense to his probation violation. Id. ,r1. Because Allen did not 
challenge his conviction, any collateral legal consequences of the conviction 
were not at issue. 
The Warner and Allen decisions are anomalous. They ignore this 
Court's own precedent, Utah Supreme Court precedent, and federal law 
consistent with Utah precedent. They ignore the distinction between 
crimin.al convictions on the one hand, and sentencing, probation, and parole 
decisions on the other hand. They ignore the law that presu1nes that 
collateral legal consequences attend crin1inal convictions, but refuses to 
presume that such consequences attend sentencing, probation, and 
revocation decisions. 
Warner challenged his probation revocation, not his conviction. 2015 
UT App 81, ,r1. But when the State argued that Warner's enumerated 
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consequences were "merely hypothetical or possible," this Court 
determined that the State's argument was "based on the standard applicable 
to civil cases, not criminal cases." Id. if 3. 
As authority, the Court cited its own decision in Ridgway, 2012 UT 
App 35. The Court recited Ridgway's language that "collateral consequences 
may be presumed when 'a party is challenging a criminal conviction,' but 
not in civil cases." Id. ( quoting Ridgway, 2015 UT App 35, ,I3). Ridgway's 
language is correct, but it does not support the Warner decision. Collateral 
legal consequences may not be presumed merely because a case addresses 
criminal proceedings. Rather, collateral legal consequences are presumed 
when an appellant is challenging a criminal conviction. That is because - as 
stated- a criminal conviction almost always results in legally-imposed 
collateral consequences. 
But a defendant's probation revocation, parole decision, or sentence 
1nay not be so used. While probation, parole, and sentencing decisions may 
be considered by courts, en1ployers, and others in 1naking discretionary 
decisions, they do not impose consequences as a n1atter of la·vv. The l1Varner 
court therefore is therefore anomalous. 
The Allen court also misread relevant precedent when it rejected the 
State's 1nooh1ess argument. In that case, Allen appealed his sentence 
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arguing that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not asserting 
that Allen had mental health issues as a defense for his probation violation. 
2015 UT App 163, ,r1. While Allen's appeal was pending, Allen was 
released from jail. Id. if 4 n.2. The State therefore argued that the appeal was 
moot. Id. 
The panel rejected that argument, reading Duran to hold that "in a 
criminal case a [defendant's] release from custody renders a case moot only 
if there is no possibility of collateral consequences." Id. But in so doing, the 
panel ignored the Duran language that applies this standard only when a 
defendant is challenging a criminal conviction, not when he is challenging 
other decisions that may be made during the crhninal process-such as a 
decision to revoke probation. 
Allen, like Warn.er, was anomalous. Both cases misinterpret governing 
case law. Accordingly, this Court should apply the collateral legal 
consequences exception as set forth in Utah Supreme Court case law and in 
this Court's own extensive pre-2015 case law, not as set forth in Warner and 
Allen. 
B. Defendant's appeal is 1noot because now that his sentence 
has expired, this Court cannot grant him any relief. 
Defendant here is not challenging his crin1inal conviction. Rather, he 
is challenging dish·ict court's revocation of his probation. He seeks another 
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probation hearing to ask the district court to reconsider its decision to 
revoke his probation. But his sentence has expired, and he has been 
released from prison. Thus, Defendant's appeal is moot. As explained, an 
issue becomes moot while an appeal is pending if "circumstances change so 
that the conh·oversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested 
impossible or of no legal effect." Peterson, 2012 UT App 363, 4. A new 
revocation hearing will not allow the district court to reinstate his probation 
and give hhn another opportunity to avoid the prison term ordered as a 
result of his probation revocation. 
Moreover, because Defendant is challenging his probation revocation, 
not his conviction, the court will not presu1ne that the probation decision 
will have collateral legal consequences.5 Rather, Defendant has the burden 
to show some concrete injury-in-fact-smne consequence imposed by law 
that he will actually, not hypothetically, suffer because his probation was 
5 Utah's other exception to the mooh1ess doctrine, the exception for 
issues of public interest likely to recur and capable of evading review, does 
not apply here. Sec Ellis, 2000 UT 101, ,I26. The issue here is not one of 
public interest. It does not address a class action, the interpretation of sorrte 
constitutional provision, the validity or construction of a statute, or the 
propriety of an administrative ruling. See id. ~27. Nor is it an issue likely 
to recur and capable of evading review. 
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revoked. Nothing suggests that he can do so. For that reason, this Court 
should dismiss his appeal as moot. 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE DISTRICT 
COURT PLAINLY ERRED BY REVOKING PROBATION 
Even if his appeal were not moot, Defendant cannot prevail because 
he has not shown that the district court plainly erred by revoking his 
probation. Defendant argues that "the trial court violated the mandate rule 
when it revoked [his] probation without complying with the Court of 
Appeals' mandate on remand." Br.Aplt. 6. Defendant did not preserve this 
claim below and has not established plain error on appeal. 
A. Defendant has not shown that the district court violated this 
Court's mandate, much less that the court plainly erred for 
doing so. 
Defendant argues that the district court "violated the n1andate rule in 
its determination of this case on remand." Br.Aplt. 6. Because Defendant 
did not make this argument below, it is unpreserved. Thus, Defendant 
argues plain error. To establish plain error, he n1ust show obvious, hann.ful 
error. Error is obvious only where there is n settled appellate authority" to 
support his cJaim. State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). 
Defendant points to no authority suggesting that the district court violated 
this Court's mandate when it confinned that it would have revoked 
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Defendant's probation on the basis of his single violation for not 
cooperating and complying with AP&P. 
"The mandate rule dictates that the pronouncements of an appellate 
court on legal issues in a case become the law of that case. The mandate 
rule . .- . binds both the district court and the parties to honor the mandate of 
the appellate court." Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 
2011 UT App 252, ,JS, 262 P.3d 1188 (citing Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Ivers, 2009 
UT 56, ,r12, 218 P.3d 583 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Whether a 
district court complies with an appellate court's mandate is a question of 
law. McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2013 UT App 20, if19, 299 P.3d 1139. 
But before reviewing the district court's compliance, the reviewing 
court must ask a preliminary question. As the Utah Supreme Court 
explained, that" crucial question" is what the appellate court meant when it 
remanded the case. State v. Lopes, 2001 UT 85, ,118, 980 P.2d 191. 
In remanding this case, this Court ordered the district court to 
"reassess whether, under all the circumstances," Defendant's "probation 
should be revoked." Legg I, 20-14 UT App 80, if25. Defendant asserts that 
this Court meant that it "had no confidence that a decisjon to revoke 
probation based on [Defendant's] relatively 1ninor failure to contact his 
probation officer on five of the seven days he was on probation, would be 
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justified." Br.Aplt. 8. Defendant further asserts that the district court 
violated this Court's 1nandate when "(d]espite the Court of Appeals' clear 
expression of concern that the single violation was not enough to revoke 
[Defendant's] probation," it "nonetheless decided '[t]here is no question 
that if there had been any finding of violation of probation that it would 
have been revoked."' Id. 9 (referencing R377:21). 
But this Court did not suggest that it lacked confidence that revoking 
on the basis of the single violation was justifiable. To the contrary, this 
Court expressly recognized that" a single violation is sufficient to support a 
probation revocation." Legg I, 2014 UT App 80, if 11. 
The Court was not concerned with what the disb·ict court could do, 
but with what it would have done. The Court merely expressed that it was 
"not confident that, standing on its own, the single violation would have 
resulted in a revocation of probation," i.e., that the disb·ict court would have 
revoked probation had it found only the single violation. Legg I, 2014 UT 
App 80, 'lf25 It therefore asked the district court to "reassess whether, 
under all the circumstances,. [Defendant's] probation should be revoked." 
Id. 
In other words, the mandate told the district court to reassess the 
willfulness of the drug-possession and failure-to-establish-a-residence 
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violations. It should then detennine- on the basis of whatever willful 
violations had been established-whether Defendant's probation should be 
revoked. But when the State withdrew the drug-possession and failure-to-
establish-a-residence allegations, it was no longer necessary to reconsider 
the willfulness of those violations. Only one question remained: would the 
dish·ict court have revoked Defendant's probation had there been only one 
willful violation before it-the violation for failing to cooperate and be 
compliant with AP&P. The district court fulfilled this Court's mandate 
when it determined that there was "no question" but that it would have 
revoked probation on the basis of that single violation. R377:23. Indeed the 
district court expressly stated that it had "no question that that would have 
been [its] ruling." R377:24. Moreover, the court made clear that even 
reassessing its decision on re1nand, it would find that the "circumstances 
still support it." Id. 
B. Defendant has not shown that the district court plainly erred 
when it exercised its discretion to revoke his probation on the 
basis of his single violation. 
Defendant finally asserts that the district court plainly erred in 
revoking his probation "on an insufficient basis." Br.Aplt. 11. But 
Defendant's willfully failing to cooperate and cmnply with his probation 
officer was a sufficient basis. 
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A district court acts "within its considerable discretion" in making 
probation decisions, including its decisions on what sanctions to impose for 
any violations. Vazquez, 2014 UT App 159, if7. These include decisions on 
whether to impose an original prison sentence, to reinstate probation, or to 
modify probation. See id. "A court abuses its discretion only when 'no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."' Id. 
(quoting State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991)). A "single 
violation of probation is legally sufficient to support a probation 
revocation." Legg I, 2014 UT App 80, ifll (citing Jameson, 800 P.2d at 804). 
Here, the record demonstrates that the district court acted within its 
discretion when it revoked probation. Defendant had a history of violent 
crilnes, including "n1ultiple assaults, theft fr01n a person, aggravated 
assaults, arson, violation of a protective order, and burglary."6 R1007 at 267. 
Defendant committed the offenses for which he was on probation within six 
months following his release fr01n prison. R1007 at 267. The offenses were 
both against his girlfriend. R1007 at 268. He also had 11 a history of arrn.ing 
himself ,vith vveapons." R1007 at 267. Moreover, the distTict court had 
6 The quoted n1aterial is frorn the April 24, 2012 amended probation 
violation report. The report is filed at R1007 at 265-69 and R0067 at 292-96. 
The reports are attached to the back side of the front cover of the pleadings 
file in their respective cases. 
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determined when it first revoked Defendant's probation that Defendant was 
likely ineligible for residential rehabilitation and that the jail did not offer 
programs that would help him. R301:127-29. 
Defendant also had a long and unsuccessful history with AP&P. That 
history began in 1987. Id. But Defendant had "never been successful at 
com1nunity supervision, either on parole or probation." Id. Indeed, AP&P 
recommended that Defendant's "probation be revoked and the original 
sentence[s] imposed." R1007 at 269. 
Under these circumstances, the decision to revoke probation and 
reinstate Defendant's suspended sentences was well within the trial court's 
discretion. A reasonable person faced with Defendant's criminal and 
probation history could readily decide to revoke based on Defendant's 
single violation for not cooperating with AP&P. Accordingly, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion, much less plainly err, when- based on 
Defendant's willful violation for not cooperating with AP&P-it revoked 
his probation and executed his suspended sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirn1. 
u (.._, 
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State v. Legg, 324 P.3d 656 (2014) 
--------------------.. ---------~--------·----------
758 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2014 UT App 80 
324 P.3d 656 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
John L. LEGG Jr., Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20120473-CA. I April 10, 2014. 
Synopsis 
Background: State petitioned to revoke defendant's 
probation and impose original sentence on conviction for 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Ryan M. Harris, J ., 
granted petition and impose original sentence. Defendant 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: 
lll remand was necessary for trial court to indicate the 
evidence relied on or the reasons for finding that 
defendant willfully possessed a controlled substance with 
knowledge of its narcotic character; 
l2l trial court made the necessary indication on the record 
as to the evidence relied on or the reasons for finding that 
defendant had willfully failed to be cooperative, 
compliant, and truthful with his probation officer; 
l3l remand was necessary for trial court to indicate the 
evidence relied on or the reasons for finding that 
defendant willfully violated the terms and conditions of 
his probation by failing to establish a place of residence or 
report his whereabouts on a daily basis; and 
l4l counsel's failure to object to trial court's finding that 
defendant violated his probation by failing to be 
cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his probation 
officer was not ineffective assistance. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
West Headnotes ( 17) 
111 Criminal Law 
-----·~·-· ·-------------
•;j=Revocation of probation or supervised release 
A trial court's decision to revoke probation is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
121 Criminal Law 
[3) 
[4) 
~-;;•Necessity of Objections in General 
Plain error is established only if: (i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, 
meaning, absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, confidence in 
the verdict is undermined. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
i=Counsel for accused 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
when raised on appeal for the first time, presents 
a question of law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Sentencing and Punishment 
.:,>~Violation of probation condition 
Sentencing and Punishment 
•~=-Degree of proof 
To revoke probation, the trial court must find a 
violation of the probation agreement by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
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(5) 
(6) 
171 
18) 
Sentencing and Punishment 
._:;;:-,Violation of probation condition 
Sentencing and Punishment 
i~•Degree of proof 
To revoke probation, the trial court must find, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
violation was willful, and not merely the result 
of circumstances beyond the probationer's 
control. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Sentencing and Punishment 
~, Violation of probation condition 
A single violation of probation is legally 
sufficient to support a probation revocation. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Controlled Substances 
i:.:~•Elements in general 
Controlled Substances 
i=Knowledge and intent 
To prove possession of a controlled substance, 
the State must establish that the accused 
exercised dominion and control over the drug 
with knowledge of its presence and narcotic 
character. West's U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
1
~"
0
.,Probation 
Before appellate court can properly address the 
issue of insufficient evidence in the context of 
an alleged violation of probation, it must first 
determine if the trial court revealed its reasoning 
and the evidence upon which it relied in a way 
that satisfies the due process requirements of a 
19) 
(10) 
fill 
probation revocation hearing. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Constitutional Law 
~--Notice and hearing; proceedings 
The minimum due process protections 
applicable to probation revocation proceedings 
include a written statement by the fact finders as 
to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking probation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Sentencing and Punishment 
1
~-=Necessity and purpose 
When a probation revocation hearing is 
recorded, a written finding as to the evidence 
relied on and reasons for revoking probation is 
constitutionally required only if the transcript 
and record before the judge do not enable a 
reviewing comt to detennine the basis of the 
judge's decision to revoke probation. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
,:-=Sentence 
Sentencing and Punishment 
,>·-Necessity and purpose 
If the evidence relied on and the reasons for 
revoking probation are not revealed, then a 
remand for a rehearing is appropriate. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
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112) 
[13) 
114) 
Criminal Law 
":.=Sentence 
Sentencing and Punishment 
.C=Sufficiency 
Remand was necessary for trial court to indicate 
the evidence relied on or the reasons for finding 
that defendant willfully possessed a controlled 
substance with knowledge of its narcotic 
character, as was necessary to support 
revocation of defendant's probation; trial court 
originally found only that defendant had control 
of the substance, "whatever it was,'' and that, 
more likely than not, he was aware of its 
presence, and after defendant's trial counsel 
objected, trial court promptly revised its findings 
to meet the applicable legal requirement, but it 
failed to give any indication of its basis for 
doing so. West's U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Sentencing and Punishment 
:.:=Sufficiency 
Trial court made the necessary indication on the 
record as to the evidence relied on or the reasons 
for finding that defendant had willfully failed to 
be cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his 
probation officer, as was necessary to support 
revocation of defendant's probation based on 
violation of that term or condition of probation; 
evidence and statements contained in the record 
made the evidentiary basis for this finding 
sufficiently clear. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Sentencing and Punishment 
1:=Defenses and objections 
If a defendant's failure to comply with terms 
and conditions of probation resulted from 
problems beyond his control, his probation 
cannot be revoked. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
115) 
(16) 
(17) 
Criminal Law 
~Sentence 
Sentencing and Punishment 
~Sufficiency 
Remand was necessary for trial court to indicate 
the evidence relied on or the reasons for finding 
that defendant willfully violated the terms and 
conditions of his probation by failing to 
establish a place of residence or report his 
whereabouts on a daily basis; trial court did not 
explain whether it found the violation to be the 
result of defendant's failure to establish a 
residence of record or whether it found the 
violation to be the result of defendant's failure 
to call in with updated "residence" information 
every night, and a showing that defendant had 
the means to comply with the residence 
requirement was necessary to establish a willful 
violation. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
~Other particular issues 
Trial counsel's failure to object to trial court's 
finding that defendant violated his probation by 
failing to be cooperative, compliant, and truthful 
with his probation officer by nol calling his 
probation officer on most days was not 
ineffective assistance of counsel; the record and 
transcript supported trial court's finding on this 
point, meaning an objection would have been 
unavailing. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
~~Particular Cases and Issues 
Failure to raise futile objections does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*658 Joanna E. Landau, for Appellant. 
Sean D. Reyes and Jeanne B. Inouye, for Appellee. 
Judge GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in 
which Judges J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and STEPHEN 
L. ROTH concurred. 
Opinion 
ORME, Judge: 
~ 1 John L. Legg Jr. appeals the trial court's decision to 
revoke his probation and impose the original sentence on 
his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly 
weapon, a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-103 (LexisNexis 2012), and for possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree 
felony, id § 76-10-503. Because of concerns we have 
with the revocation decision, we remand for further 
consideration by the trial court. 
BACKGROUND 
,r 2 In reviewing a revocation of probation, we recite the 
facts in the "light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings." State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 
1990). Here, the trial court's findings were made orally 
from the bench and were relatively sparse. Thus, our 
recitation of the facts also includes findings implicitly 
made by the trial court and matters that are undisputed in 
the record. 
the probation officer he was homeless and had no savings. 
The probation officer instructed Legg to check in by 
telephone every day until he established a residence. Legg 
claimed that he did not remember any such instruction, 
but it is undisputed that Legg failed to call on most days. 
After about a week, however, Legg showed up for a 
scheduled in-person interview with his probation officer 
and was arrested for suspected probation violations. 
1 4 During a search incident to the arrest, Legg's 
probation officer discovered a very small amount of 
cocaine-less than one-tenth of a normal dose-in the 
bottom of a pill bottle where Legg was storing his 
prescription medicine. A family member gave the piil 
bottle to Legg so he would have a more convenient 
method for storing his pills than in the bulky containers 
provided to him by jail personnel upon his release. He 
claimed to have never noticed the thirty-four to thirty-six 
milligrams of white substance in the bottle even though, 
on a regular basis, he "dumped" the pills out to take them 
as prescribed and returned the remaining contents to the 
bottle. A drug test administered at the same time showed 
that Legg had not been using cocaine. Nevertheless, the 
State initiated a separate criminal proceeding against 
Legg for possession of a controlled substance. In the 
ensuing trial, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. 
1 5 During the subsequent evidentiary hearing to consider 
revoking Legg's probation, which is the subject of this 
appeal, the trial court heard testimony from the probation 
officer and from Legg and considered the physical 
evidence of the cocaine. The trial court found, with our 
emphasis, that it was "more likely than not that [Legg] 
would know that there was a substance in there, whatever 
it was." Legg's attorney pointed *659 out that, in order to 
find a violation, the court had to be convinced that Legg 
had knowledge of the narcotic character of the substance, 
not just that he had control over it and had knowledge of 
its presence, "whatever it was." Without identifying any 
additional evidence, the trial court then immediately 
revised its finding: "I think at least by a preponderance 
I'm going to find that Mr. Legg knew that that was a 
controlled substance in the bottle[.]" 
,r 6 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found 
that Legg had violated the terms of his probation in three 
ways: (I) he knowingly possessed a controlled substance; 
(2) he failed to be cooperative, compliant, and truthful 
with his probation officer; and (3) he failed to establish a 
residence of record. In doing so, however, the trial com1 
expressed concerns about revoking probation so quickly 
and opined that Legg's probation officer "had an awful 
quick trigger on Mr. Legg in this case." 
1 3 The day he completed the jail term that was a 
component of his probation, Legg met with his probation 
officer to go over his probation agreement. Legg was 
particularly concerned about the requirement in the 
agreement that he establish a residence of record. He told 
--=------------------------------------------------~----
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
111 
, 7 Legg argues that the trial court did not properly 
focus on the requirement that probation violations must be 
willful and that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding that any violation of the probation agreement was 
willful. We review a trial court's decision to revoke 
probation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jameson, 
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). 
121 ~ 8 Legg did not preserve this issue for appeal but 
argues that the trial court was plainly in error in not 
focusing on the requirement of willfulness. Plain error is 
established only if: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, 
or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993 ). 
131 1 9 Legg also asserts that he had ineffective assistance 
of counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
when raised on appeal for the first time, presents a 
question of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,r 6, 89 
P.3d 162. 
ANALYSIS 
141 l5J, 10 To revoke probation, the trial court must find a 
violation of the probation agreement by a preponderance 
of the evidence. State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 
(Utah Ct.App.1994). In addition, the trial court must find, 
also by a preponderance of the evidence, that the violation 
was willful, see State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, 1 24, 
997 P.2d 314, and not merely the result of circumstances 
beyond the probationer's control, see State v. Hodges, 798 
P .2d 270, 277 (Utah Ct.App.1990). 
161 
,r 11 We recognize that a single violation of probation 
is legally sufficient to support a probation revocation. See 
Jameson, 800 P.2d at 804 ("The decision to grant, 
modify, or revoke probation is in the discretion of the trial 
court."). But considering the expressed qualms of the trial 
court about the revocation decision, it is appropriate to 
address each finding individually. And because it appears 
to have been the totality of the three violations found by 
the trial court that prompted the trial court's decision to 
revoke notwithstanding its misgivings, it is less than 
obvious in this case that the trial court would have 
exercised its discretion the same way if any one of the 
three violations was not properly established. 
I. Possession of a Controlled Substance 
171 1 12 Legg argues that there was insufficient evidence to 
show that he knowingly possessed a controlled substance. 
To prove possession of a controlled substance in violation 
of Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), the State must 
establish "that tl-ie accused exercised dominion and 
control over the drug with knowledge of its presence and 
narcotic character." State v. Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139,. 396 
P.2d 872, 874 (1964). Accord State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 
1386, 1388 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
,I 13 The record is more than sufficient to show, at least 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that Legg exercised 
dominion and control over the substance in his pill bottle 
*660 that later proved to be cocaine and that he had 
knowledge of its physical presence. He had exclusive 
control over the pill bottle for about a week, and the trial 
court did not exceed its discretion in inferring that by 
"dumping" out the pills on a regular basis it was more 
likely than not that Legg had knowledge of its presence. It 
is less clear; however, that Legg had knowledge of the 
substance's narcotic character. This is an essential 
element of the violation. If Legg had no idea what the 
substance at the bottom of his pill bottle was, then it 
cannot be said that he willfully violated his probation 
agreement by possessing a controlled substance. Counsel 
below was correct in raising a timely concern with the 
court that it was not enough to find that Legg knew the 
substance, "whatever it was," was in the pill bottle. 
Instead, the trial court needed to find that Legg also knew 
of the narcotic character of the substance in order to 
conclude that Legg violated the terms of his probation. 
181 ~ 14 The trial court acknowledged this and amended its 
finding to include that Legg had the requisite knowledge, 
but it did so without any reference to evidence on which it 
may have relied or the rationale for its immediately 
revised reasoning. Legg's argument about the 
insufficiency of the evidence in this regard is well taken. 
Most telli..ngly, at one point in the hearing, Legg's counsel 
complained that there was no basis for assuming that 
Legg would be able to identify cocaine residue because 
"there has never been any evidence that he has a history 
with cocaine." In response, the State conceded, "We 
didn't bring that out in any of this." However, before we 
can properly address the issue of insufficient evidence, we 
must first determine if the trial court revealed its 
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reasoning and the evidence upon which it relied in a way 
that satisfies the due process requirements of a probation 
revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). 
191 11°1 1111 ~ 15 In Gagnon, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the minimum due process protections 
applicable to probation revocation proceedings include " 
'a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence 
relied on and reasons for revoking [probation].' " Id 
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,489, 92 S.Ct. 
2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and extending Morrissey's 
parole revocation rule to probation hearings). The Court 
has explained that the "written statement required by 
Gagnon . . . helps to insure accurate factfinding with 
respect to any alleged violation and provides an adequate 
basis for review to determine if the decision rests on 
permissible grounds supported by the evidence." Black v. 
Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613-14, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 
L.Ed.2d 636 (1985). But when a probation revocation 
hearing is recorded, a written finding is "constitutionally 
required only if the transcript and record before the judge 
do not enable a reviewing court to determine the basis of 
the judge's decision to revoke probation." Morishita v. 
Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir.1983). If the 
"evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking" 
probation are not revealed, then a remand for a rehearing 
is appropriate. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). 
,r 16 In Hodges, the record contained some evidence 
supporting probation revocation, but other 
evidence-letters from a social worker and a corrections 
supervisor-was absent from the record on appeal. Id at 
273. In its finding, the trial court in Hodges did not make 
it clear how much it had relied on the missing letters and 
how much it had relied on the other evidence. Id at 274. 
We remanded because "[t]he record on review [did] not 
adequately reveal the evidence relied on by the court." Id 
at 275. 
£121 1 17 As in Hodges, the record and transcript available 
in this case do not readily reveal the evidence relied on or 
the reasons for finding that Legg willfully possessed a 
controlled substance with knowledge of its narcotic 
character. The trial court originally found only that Legg 
had control of the subs lance, "whalewr il was," and that, 
more likely than not, he was aware of its presence. After 
Legg's counsel objected, the trial court promptly revised 
its findings to meet the applicable legal requirement, but it 
failed to give any indication of its basis for doing so. 
*661 ,r 18 The State directs us to a confidential 
competency evaluation ordered by a trial court in a 
previous matter as evidence of Legg's familiarity with 
cocaine. During the court-ordered competency evaluation, 
Legg made potentially incriminating statements to a 
social worker. The trial court did not reveal if it relied on 
this evidence or not, although it apparently was among the 
voluminous materials before the court. 
,r 19 Because we cannot determine from the record what 
evidence, if any, the trial court relied on in finding that 
Legg had knowledge of the narcotic character of the 
substance in his pill bottle, we cannot conclude that Legg 
willfully violated his probation. We therefore remand to 
the trial court to identify the evidence it relied on and its 
reason for moving so quickly from a finding of "whatever 
it was" to a finding of knowledge that the substance was 
cocaine. See Black, 471 U.S. at 613-14, 105 S.Ct. 2254 
(holding that without a finding from the trial court 
detailing the evidence relied on and the reasons for 
probation revocation, there will not be "an adequate basis 
for review to determine if the decision rests on 
permissible grounds supported by the evidence"). 
II. Failure To Be Cooperative, Compliant, and 
Truthful 
,r 20 Legg argues that the evidence is insufficient to show 
that he willfully failed to be cooperative, compliant, and 
truthful with his probation officer. The probation officer 
testified that he instructed Legg to check in by telephone 
every day until he established a residence. Legg failed to 
do so. The State produced evidence that Legg could have 
called every day if he had wanted to do so. While it may 
have been inconvenient at times, Legg admitted that he 
did have access to telephones. It is also clear that Legg 
had the correct telephone number for his probation officer 
because he called and left two messages on the second 
day of his probation. The trial court found the probation 
officer's testimony to be more reliable and ruled that 
Legg's failure to call was a willful violation of his 
probation agreement. 
1131 ~ 21 Again, the trial court did not explicitly reveal the 
evidence relied on or its reasoning in reaching this 
conclusion, see supra 1 19, but on this issue the evidence 
and statements contained in the record make the 
evidentiary basis for this finding sufficiently clear. See 
Morishita v. Morris, 621 P .2d 691, 693 n. 2 (Utah 1980) 
("[T]he transcript, in which many statements by the judge 
appear, reveals the judge's thought process and the 
conclusions he drew from the evidence. An entry of 
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law would add 
nothing[.]"). Concerning the first prong of the plain error 
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test, we do not conclude that the trial court made any 
error, plain or otherwise, in connection with this ruling. 
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
The evidence was sufficient to reasonably conclude that 
Legg knew he was supposed to call, that he had the means 
to call, and that his failure to consistently do so was 
willful. See State v. Brady, 2013 UT App 102, ~ 7, 300 
P.3d 778 (concluding that findings of willfulness in the 
probation revocation context can be implicit). 
III. Failure To Establish a Residence 
1141 1 22 Legg argues that the court plainly erred because 
the evidence was insufficient to show that he willfully 
failed to establish a residence of record. Legg argues that 
the trial cowt based its finding solely on the undisputed 
fact that Legg remained homeless after one week of 
probation. If this was, in fact, the trial court's reasoning, 
then it may have plainly erred. If an "appellant's failure ... 
resulted from problems beyond his contro1, his probation 
cannot be revoked." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 277 
(Utah Ct.App.1990). On appeal, however, the State argues 
that the requirement to call every day was an 
accommodation to Legg that effectively replaced the 
requirement that he establish a residence of record. This 
allowed Legg to remain transient so long as he reported 
his temporary "residence of record" every night. 
1151 1 23 The trial court, however, did not explain whether 
it found the violation to be the result of Legg's failure to 
establish a residence of record or whether it found the 
violation to be the result of Legg's failure to call in with 
updated "residence" infonnation every night. It certainly 
appears that it was *662 the former, although the trial 
court cut short any opportunity to flesh out the basis for 
this claimed violation. The judge stated: 
I think I can find based on the 
evidence that has been presented 
today that Mr. Legg did fail to 
establish a residence of record and 
that ... he did fail to be cooperative, 
compliant and truthful with certain 
dealings .... So I'm going to make a 
finding without even hearing from 
you folks on argument ... that those 
two have been violated. 
This finding leaves us without "adequate basis for review 
to detennine if the decision rests on permissible grounds 
supported by the evidence." See Black v. Romano, 4 71 
U.S. 606, 613-14, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 L.Ed.2d 636 
(1985). Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to 
identify the facts on which it relied in concluding that 
Legg willfully failed to establish a residence of record. 
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
fl 61 1171 1 24 Legg argues that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to 
object to the trial court's revocation of probation without 
sufficient evidence of the willfulness of Legg' s violations. 
We conclude that trial counsel's failure to object to the 
finding that Legg violated his probation by failing to be 
cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his probation 
officer-Le., by not calling his probation officer on most 
days-was not ineffective. As previously discussed, see 
supra 1 21, the record and transcript support the trial 
court's finding on this point, meaning an objection would 
have been unavailing. "Failure to raise futile objections 
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.,, 
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 126, 1 P.3d 546. As a result, 
we conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective in this 
regard. And because we have already remanded for 
reconsideration on the remaining issues, it is unnecessary 
to address the effectiveness of counsel with respect to 
those issues. 
CONCLUSION 
125 We affirm the finding that Legg willfully violated his 
probation agreement by failing to be cooperative, 
compliant, and truthful with his probation officer. But we 
are not confident that, standing on its own, the single 
violation that we affirm would have resulted in a 
revocation of probation. We remand on the issues of 
possession of a controlled substance and failure to 
establish a residence of record for further consideration 
and explanation by the trial court. On remand, the trial 
court must reassess whether, under all the circumstances, 
Legg's probation should be revoked. 
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Addendum B 
·<JP 
State of Utah 
GARY R. HERBERT 
Governor 
SPENCER J. COX 
lieutenant Governor 
Utah Department of Corrections 
Division of Institutional Operations 
ROLLIN COOK 
Executive Director 
LONDON STROMBERG 
Deputy Executive Director 
JERRY POPE 
Director, Division of lnstit111io11a/ Opera/ions 
Re: John Lyle Jr Legg DOB: December 13, 1968 OFF# 43079 
To Whom It May Concern: 
July 15, 2015 
This letter is to confirm that the above named individual was incarcerated under the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Department of Corrections. This inmate was most recently received on 
May 4, 2012. This inmate was Discharged on July 15, 2015 
Sin~yr~.
1
ly. _ 
1/ . /) '} 
;U le I, l,l, ip /GZL t>k l-; 
De1~isc Rucker, Office Specialist 
Utah State Prison 
010 Records Department 
14717 South Minuteman {)rive, Draper1 UT 84020 • ldr.phon~ (801) 545•5800 • f:ir--.imi(t> (ROI) "i?3-7477 
